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Angola is an important FDI receptor, the second highest FDI inflows receiver in 
Africa. Its vast volume of oil, gas and diamonds have made of the country an 
appealing destination for Chinese FDI, whose rapid economic growth has lead to a 
rushing need for resources in order to feed the Chinese production. Since 2002, 
China’s loan-for-oil deals with Angola have increased to the point of becoming 
China’s top trading partner in Africa. Sino-Angolan relations present a growing 
complex interplay of benefits and challenges to reach development. This study 
focuses on the impact Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from China has on Angola’s 
socio-economic development, and whether this development is long-term 
sustainable. Based on the United Nations’ definition of Sustainable Development, the 
indicators used to scrutinise the impact of FDI are: GDP, infrastructure development, 
corruption, unemployment, poverty and inequality rates, among others. 
Results show that Chinese FDI brought economic growth and enabled fast 
infrastructure reconstruction, likewise market openness. Nevertheless, FDI has not 
lead to sustainable socio-economic development as standards of living barely 
improved; poverty is still widespread, as 36.6% of Angolan families leave below 
poverty line, unemployment rate remains high (reaching 25%), and corruption is 
prevalent. China’s Aid assistance and infrastructure projects showed precarious 
consequences due to missing standards, poor quality work and lack of adaptability to 
local needs. Furthermore, market openness allowed the entry of low quality Chinese 
goods in the Angolan market, which besides providing a broad range of cheap 
products, harmed Angolan manufacture sector. Moreover, Angola’s strong 
dependence on oil exports to China represents the great obstacle for Angolan 
sustainable development. In order to offset Angola’s weak and dependent position 
over China and ensure sustainable development, Angola must work towards trade 
diversification and attracting investment from other countries. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper sheds light on the process of economic and social development of 
Angola. In development, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is viewed as an efficient 
tool to generate wealth and boost the economy of the receiving country. Besides fast 
economic growth, recent studies suggest that it can carry countervailing risk. This 
paper suggests that FDI does not necessarily lead to a sustainable and long-term 
development. In a context in which FDI is increasingly orientated towards developing 
countries, whose perceive it as a tool for reaching sustainable development, I believe 
elaborating a study focused on the link between FDI and development is particularly 
reliable. The paper intends to answer the research question “does FDI bring 
sustainable social-economic development?” by analysing the second highest FDI 
receiver in Africa (Sandrey, 2009); the Republic of Angola; a developing country, oil 
and diamonds producer, ruled under a oligarchic system, which suffers from lack of 
infrastructure, high unemployment, and a conflictive social situation after a 27 year-
lasting civil war. 
In order to conduct the methodology, the paper uses the classic definition of 
Sustainable Development established by the United Nations Commission on 
Environment and Development in 1987; “Development is considered sustainable if it 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of further 
generations” (WB, 2004, p.9). This definition embraces three dimensions; 
environmental, social and economic. The paper exclusively focuses on the social and 
economic. Hence, the indicators used for the analysis of Angola’s development are 
GDP growth, poverty and inequality rate, employment rate, and corruption rate 
among others.  
For the work, it is above all important to understand the concept of	   Foreign Direct 
Investment. FDI is defined as “an investment involving a long-term relationship and 
reflecting a lasting interest and control by a resident entity in one economy (foreign 
direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other 
that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign 
affiliate)” (UNCTAD, 2000, p.245). The lasting interest implies the existence of a 
long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise, likewise a 
degree of influence and control by the investor over the management of the 
enterprise (OCDE, 2013). In order to consider an investment as FDI, it must achieve 
at least 10% of the voting stock and at least 10% of equity share in an enterprise 
operating in a country other than the investor’s home country (UNCTAD, 2013). 
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2. Academic debate 
There are two main positions in the current academic debate about the relationship 
between FDI and development. The dominant approach considers FDI as a key 
element for international economic integration that can lead to long-lasting economic 
development (OCDE, 2013). It defends that FDI opens international marketing 
networks and brings spill-over effects such as indirect knowledge, technological 
transfer, managerial skillsets, and innovation in the host-country (Narula & Driffield, 
2012). According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, “FDI is key 
to solving Africa’s economic problems” (Mwilima, 2003, p.31). This argument is not 
commonly accepted, since recent research studies started to question the linkage 
between FDI and long-term socio-economic development.  
The second approach argues the countervailing risks of FDI and how its benefits can 
be limited (Nunnenkamp, 2003). Development can only be reached when FDI is 
regulated by efficient public policies in the receiving country. Indeed, the host-
country’s government plays an important role to ensure spill-over effects reach the 
population and improve living standards (Loungani & Razin, 2001). Still, countries 
depend on their capacity of attracting FDI to have enough means to impose policy 
conditions regarding the inward investment (Nunnenkamp, 2003). Withal, less 
restrictive public policies induce less national management, which allow foreign 
investors to have major control over host-country firms; making of FDI a corporate 
governance mechanism (Loungani & Razin, 2001). In between these two 
approaches, our hypothesis inclines its supports toward the second academic 
approach as it suggests that FDI does not necessarily lead to a sustainable 
development. 
3. Case study of Angola 
Angola is an important FDI receiver, the second highest FDI inflows receiver in Africa 
(Sandrey, 2009). Its vast volume of oil, gas and diamonds have made of Angola an 
appealing destination for Chinese FDI, whose rapid economic growth has lead to a 
rushing need for resources in order to feed the Chinese production (Shinn, 2011).  
In 2002 the civil war of Angola ended, its economy was going through a sever crisis, 
the conflict was still recent, institutions were weak and unstable, and unemployment 
and poverty were widespread (Bräutigam, 2010). Investment in infrastructure and 
boosting the economy were needed in order to foster business, as well as political 
stability. Hence, Angola applied for assistance to the international donor community, 
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by submitting the Poverty Relief Strategy Paper; it was rejected due to lack of 
consultation with relevant stakeholders during the paper’s formulation (CCS, 2007). 
Shortly after, China offered a $2 billion (€1.6 billion) concessional loan “to fund the 
reconstruction of shattered infrastructure throughout the country” (Campos & Vines, 
2008, p. 3). In 2004, the loan was made effective through the first installment and its 
implementation was divided into two phases, with $1 billon assigned to each phase. 
The first was released in 2004, and the second half was made available in 2007 
(Campos & Vines, 2008).  
In broad terms, the functioning of the loan was established to work as a current 
account; it requires the Ministry of Finance request, and the disbursements are made 
by EximBank directly into the accounts of the contractors and the repayment starts 
when a project is completed (Campos & Vines, 2008.). The arrangement allows 
deducting the servicing of the debt from the oil revenues (Campos & Vines, 2008). 
Moreover, 70 per cent reconstruction-related public tenders (tied to the loan) are 
awarded to Chinese firms; who clearly benefit as it provides employment for Chinese 
workers, facilitates oil extraction and creates business opportunities (Bräutigam, 
2010).  
The first phase of the project financed by the Eximbank amounted to 31 contracts, 
involving 50 projects on health, education, energy and water, agriculture, transport, 
social communication and public (Campos & Vines, 2008). Among all, the largest 
project was rehabilitation of a 371km long road between Luanda and Uíge. In the 
health sector, the focus was on rehabilitating and enlarging provincial and municipal 
hospitals, as well as district health canters. In education, the priority was on 
rehabilitation of schools, whereas the money in agriculture intended to improve the 
irrigation system and agricultural machinery (Campos & Vines, 2008). In 2007, the 
second phase of the loan was started, involving a total of 52 projects. The focus was 
on fisheries and telecommunications projects; “the acquisition of 36 large fishing 
trawlers and 3,000 boats for industrial and artisanal use, as well as 10 coast guard 
vessels” (Campos & Vines, 2008, p.15). In telecommunications, the investment was 
made in the construction of next generation networks, Internet protocol and intelligent 
networks across the country (Campos & Vines, 2008). That year, as a prolongation 
to the first phase of the loan, Eximbank provided an extension of $500 million, which 
intended to finance ‘complementary actions’ after giving an increase of $1 billion in 
2006 (Campos & Vines, 2008). The impact of these loans brought tangible results in 
terms of infrastructure improvements (Davies et al., 2008).  
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Meanwhile, China International Fund Ltd, a private institution, extended $2.9 billion to 
aid the post-war reconstruction of Angola. The credit was entirely managed by the 
Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional (GRN), Angola’s Reconstruction Office created 
by President dos Santos, which was exclusively accountable to the President. 
Shortly afterwards, GRN projects caught the attention of the media for being 
inefficient, murky, and clearly corrupt. Moreover, the lack of planning, misleading and 
illegal arrangements resulted in many projects failing. The growing prevailing crony-
client network was partly attributed to Angola’s government mismanagement, which 
had been subject to weak monitoring mechanisms (Grimm, 2011). Until 2010, 
“transparent regulations and legal institutions enforcing property and contractual 
rights were lacking or underdeveloped” (Grimm, 2011, p. 3); allowing a prevailing 
crony-client network to gain control over the sources of state funding. These 
structural problems, jointly with budget mismanagement and out-of-proportion 
expenses (aggravated by the international crisis and a temporary fall in oil prices) 
raised external and internal debt (BTI, 2012). Despite the reduction in corruption, it 
remains pervasive and one of the major limitation for social development (Chêne, 
2010).  
1. Impact of FDI on socio-economic development 
 
This section classifies positive and negative impacts, and examines if FDI leads to a 
sustainable development. 
4.1. Positive	  impact	  
a) Sino-Angolan commercial relationship 
The magnitude of economic impact FDI had on Angola’s economy has been 
substantial when looking at the country’s oil exports. Angola’s oil exports to China 
has gone from 1 million of US$ in 2002, to 11 million of US$ in 2006 (CCS, 2006). In 
2007, total bilateral trade amounted to 15.3 million of US$. In 2009, “oil comprised 95 
per cent of exports and 85 per cent of government revenue” (Zhao, 2011, p.1). By 
2010, the value of the Sino-Angolan commercial exchanges almost reached $25,000 
million; China’s imports from Angola reached $22,000 million (55% more than in 
2009), while Angola’s imports from China accounted for $2,000 million (16% less 
than in 2009) (BTI, 2012). In 2013, Angola’s exports to China account for almost 50 
per cent of total of Angola’s goods exports (Hernandez, 2013).  
b) Market openness and access to low-cost manufactured goods 
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The improvement of Sino-Angola commercial exchange allowed low-price Chinese 
manufactured goods successfully spread across large part of the Angolan 
population. Moreover, the good’s low-price made them accessible the poorest sector 
of the population (Osei & Mubiru, 2010).  
c) Growth of GDP 
The massive inward investment, jointly with increase in the oil sector and market 
openness increased Angola’s GDP, which experienced constant growth from 2004 to 
2008 [Figure 1]. The average of GDP Growth Rate has been of 10.72 per cent from 
2000 to 2013. After 2008, GDP growth moderated due the Angola’s financial 
structural crisis, aggravated by the global financial crisis. Apart from that, positive 
economic performance has been constant until nowadays. It is mostly attributable to 
the increase of oil production from new oil fields, but also to booming oil prices (IMF, 
2006). The clear-defined pattern of the graph below shows an increase of Angola’s 
production of goods and servises closely linked to China’s involvemnet. Studies 
indicate that the economic opening has improved investment conditions of Angola 
(BTI, 2012). The number of foreign companies investing and operating in the country 
increased notably over the last years (BTI, 2012).  
Figure 1. Angola’s GDP (Current US$) 
 
Source: World Bank, 2012. 
f) Infrastructure 
China’s involvement has enabled a fast reconstruction of infrasturcture. The 2 billion 
US$ loans encompassed a total of 102 projects addressed to different sectors 
(Campos & Vines, 2008). Experts denaunceed that benefits of these contruction 
have yet been limited due to the lack of a fesaible organisation and low quality work 








GDP per capita of Angola 
(constant 2005 US$)  
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been successfully finished and in overall, the loans have brought tangible results in 
terms of infrastructure improvements (Davies et al., 2008).  
4.2. Negative	  impact	  	  
a) Low impact on living standards 
Despite of the economic growth, Angola is still one of the most unequal countries in 
the world and figures regarding poverty are distrubing (AfDB, et al, 2012). The profits 
from the oil industry have been concentrated into the hands of an elite, blocking the 
redistributive effect of gains from happening. Poverty Indicators such as the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Poverty Index, which measures 
the average progress of a country in human development, ranks Angola as the 89th 
out of 108 developing countries, whose HPI have been calculated (OECD, 2008). 
Moreover, “the UN estimates that 28 percent of the population is living in extreme 
poverty and another 40 percent are struggling to survive below the poverty line” 
(Sadrey, 2009, p.11). According to an “Inquiry into the Well-Being of the Population”, 
conducted by the National Statistics Institute in 2007-2008,  “36.6% of Angolan 
families live below the national poverty” (BTI, 2012, p. 3). In addition, GINI coeficient 
is 0.586 in 2009 (AfDB, et al, 2012); proving a high level of inequality. Moreover, 
experts agree that “the gap between the richest and poorest strata has been 
growing” (BTI, 2012, p.22). Much of the poverty  concentrates in the agricultural 
sector; which accounts for eight percent of the GDP, while employes over 50 percent 
of the labour force (Sadrey, 2009). 
b) Low quality Chinese construction and lack of adaptability to local needs 
Chinese construction has been proved to bring serious problems due to its poor 
quality, cheap construction products and lack of adaptability to the population needs 
(Kabemba, 2012). Moreover, Chinese enterpises seem not to adapt their projects to 
the local context; In fact, impressive mega buildins such as out-of-portion stadios or 
the construction of a new stelite town, such as “the Kilamba Kiaxi flagship”, a $3.5 
billion project where nobody yet lives are clear examples of it (Benazeraf, & Alves, 
2014). Last, the lack of qualified personal for new hospitals and schools reduces the 
potential use these public buildings could have (Benazeraf, & Alves, 2014). 
Therefore, housing and urbanisation policies should undertake more in-depth 
feasibility studies locally and drawing from international expertise” (Benazeraf, & 
Alves, 2014). These inefficiencies are both attributed to the Angolan government as 
well as the Chinese enterprises. 
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c) Corruption 
 
Angola is rated as the 25th most corrupt country in the world (Transparency 
international, 2013). Despite of the implemented reforms in 2010 with regard to 
revenue and budget transparency, the overall legal and institutional anti-corruption 
framework remain highly insufficient and underdeveloped, lacking financial resources 
and technical expertise (Chêne, 2010). China’s failure to condition loans on Good 
Governance misses the opportunity to reduce corruption and foster an efficient 
budget management. Angola continues to face major challenges of weak 
governance and widespread corruption at all levels of society, and this is a real hitch 
for Angola’s development that needs to be solved (Chêne, 2010). 
d) Decline of Angolan Manufactures 
The entry of cheap Chinese products beside increasing consumption-related utility, 
brought challenging side effects such as a decline of domestic manufactures from 
6.07% of the GDP in 2009 to 5.79% of value-added GDP in 2010 (New African, 
2012). Sectors such as the clothing and furniture have been driven out of the market 
due to the unequal technological infrastructure (New African, 2012). Low investment, 
ill-advised industrial policies, rigid macro-economic frameworks and low 
diversification have hindered its competitive industrial capacity (Sandrey & Edinger, 
2011). 
e) Unemployment 
Despite the expectations on China’s Aid projects, as an economic activity that would 
contribute to job opportunities, these predictions have not been met at all. Initially, it 
was established that 30% of the Chinese firms’ workforce would be of Angolan 
workers, but this quota has rarely been attained (BTI, 2012). The justification of 
Chinese enterprises was the insufficient number of Angolan skilled workers. Despite 
of the decrease of unemployment rate since 2006 (35% unemployment rate), it has 
remained at 25% of unemployment since 2008 until nowadays (AfDB, 2014).  
f) Lack of economic diversification  
Angola shows a marginal degree of diversification in exports in which “oil 
represented 97.5% of the country’s exports in 2010, followed by diamonds (2%) and 
gas and coﬀee (0.5%)” (AfDB, et al, 2012, p.7). This situation is fostered by trade 
with China, which accounts for 43.1% of Angola’s exports (AfDB, et al, 2012). This 
dynamic encourages Angola to remain specialised in raw materials. It implies high 
vulnerability to commodity prices and external shocks (Renard, 2011).  
	   8	  
Figure 2. Angola’s exports by sector in 2010 ( percentage of the GDP)	  
Source: AfDB, et al, 2012, p.4. 
Furthermore, a subsequent critical concern towards the oil industry is that it does not 
create equitable wealth; it enriches a minority while the majority falls into poverty. 
The figures regarding the country’s diversification; oil and gas account for nearly 46.9 
percent of GDP, while diamonds bring in another two percent (AfDB, et al., 2012). 
Recently, there has been a growing diversification of FDI that resulted in an increase 
of 7.7% in the non-oil sector, “which helped to offset the effects of production 
problems in the oil sector” (AfDB, et al., 2012, p.2). Despite of the efforts, Angola 
remains highly dependent on oil revenues. 
Figure 3. Angola’s GDP by sector in 2010  (percentage of the GDP) 
 
Source: AfDB, et al, 2012, p.4. 
97.5%	  
2.0%	   0.5%	  Angola’s exports by sector in 2010 (GDP perdentage) 
Oil 
Diamonds 
















Angola’s GDP by sector in 2010 (percentage of the GDP)	  
	   9	  
5. Conclusion 
The evidence confirms that impact of Chinese FDI on Angola’s development is 
limited if not dubious. Although, FDI brought positive effects such as rapid rebuilding 
of infrastructure, economic growth and market openness, it has not promoted 
sustainable socio-economic development in Angola.  First of all, infrastructure built 
by Chinese enterprises has generally been of poor quality and brought problems for 
its habitability (Benazeraf & Alves, 2014). Moreover, many of Chinese projects have 
failed to adapt to the needs of the local population and have excluded Angolan 
workforce and monitoring as part of the projects (Kabemba, 2012). Secondly, 
Chinese FDI has reduced the possibility of capital formation or job creation 
opportunity among Angolan population, which suffers from high rates of 
unemployment (AfDB, et al 2012). As result, unemployment rates remain 25% and 
despite of the slight decline, it remains a major challenge for reducing poverty. 
Thirdly, the entry of low-cost Chinese products in the Angolan market, harmed the 
Angolan manufacture sector, comparatively disadvantage (Sandrey & Edinger, 
2011). Fourthly, Angola’s current development is not long-term viable as it strongly 
dependents on oil export to China. This is the major limitation for a sustainable 
development, as it places Angola in a weak and dependent position over foreign 
Chinese enterprises (Loungani & Razin, 2001).  
 
In order to confront this challenging situation, academics recommend African 
integration though regional trade agreements in order to boost Angola’s trade 
diversification and improve their bargaining position, as well as attracting investment 
from other countries. In addition, major FDI diversification would also enable the 
country to establish its own policies and conditions, ensuring spill-over effects 
reaching their population. Moreover, it would be a positive step working towards a 
major level of government accountability and transparency, structural reforms and 
coercive public measures to ensure the reduction of corruption and foster wealth 
distribution. 
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RESEARCH QUESTION
DOES FDI BRING SUSTAINABLE SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TO ANGOLA?
INTRODUCTION
Angola has become the second highest FDI 
receiver in Africa. Its vast volume of oil, gas 
and diamonds have made of Angola and 
appealing destination for Chinese FDI. 
China’s rapid economic growth has lead to 




FDI is “an investment involving a long-term 
relationship and reflecting a lasting interest 
and control by a resident entity in one eco-
nomy (foreign direct investor or parent en-
terprise) in an enterprise resident in an eco-
nomy other that of the foreign direct inves-
tor (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or 
foreign affiliate)” (UNCTAD, 2000, p.245).
ACADEMIC 
DEBATE
Relationship between FDI and socio-
economic development
1) The dominant approach: FDI is a key 
element for development. It promotes de-
velopment through international economic 
integration, market openness, indirect 
knowledge and technological transfer, and 
innovation in the receiving country.
2) Alternative approach: FDI does not 
necessarily lead to a sustainable develop-
ment. The host-country regulations play a 
reliable role ensuring spill-over effects 






Market openness and access to low-cost 
Chinese manufactured goods
Fast reconstruction of infrastructure
CONCLUSION 
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FDI & DEVELOPMENT
Desk-study on the impact that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 




established by the United Nations 
Commission on Environment 
and Development in 1987; 
”Development is considered 
sustainable if it meets the 
needs of the present without 
compromising the ability 
of further generations” 
(WB, 2004, p.9).
 Social The indicators of socio-economic 
development:
• Unemployment rate
• Poverty and inequality rates
• GDP
• Infrastructure development
• Sino-Angola import/exports value
• Corruption rate
• Degree of economic diversification
This definition embraces three dimensions;
 Environmental
 Economic 
(The paper exclusively focuses on the social 
and economic.)
}
Low impact on living standards
Lack of economic diversification
Decline of Angolan manufactures
Poor quality Chinese construction and
insufficient adaptability to local needs
NEGATIVE
Source: AfDB, et al, 2012, p.4.
Angola’s exports by sector in 2010
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